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UNDER THE SPREADING ANALOGY OF ARTICLE 2
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DANIEL E. MURRAY*
I. INTRODUCTIONO VER six decades ago Dean Pound forecast that American courts
would eventually adopt the view that statutes should be received
fully into the body of the law "to be reasoned from by analogy the same
as any other rule of law"1 on the principle that statutory law is of equal
authority to case law and then eventually on the basis that statutory law
is a later and more direct expression of the general will and a superior
authority to judge-made rules. Pound's basic theory of the adoption would
seem to bear some modest relationship to Lord Coke's statement which
was derived from Bracton:
"Equitie" is a construction made by the judges, that cases out of the letter of a
statute, yet being within the same mischiefe, or cause of the making of the same, shall
be within the same remedie that the statute provideth: and the reason hereof is, that
for the law-makers could not possibly set downe all cases in expresse terms ....2
It has been shown elsewhere that this extended application of statute
law was developed in the fourteenth century,' but the American common
law system adopted the unfortunate, and now tired, shibboleth that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly. It
should be noted, however, that the English courts have extended the
application of statutes by analogy in a manner similar to that advocated
by Pound.'
In 1930, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn stated that:
Finally, statutes have a wording fixed and firm. And their effect is local for the single
state. You cannot reason from a statute to the common law. The statute of one state
affords no ground for urging a like conclusion in another with no similar statute. If
anything, the contrary. 6
After discussing the strict and liberal approaches to the interpretation of
statutes, Professor Llewellyn continued:
* Professor of Law, University of Miami
1. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 385 (1903).
2. 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England § 21 (1st Am. ed. 1853).
3. T. Plucknett, Statutes & Their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth
Century 72-81 (1922). But cf. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 l1. L.
Rev. 202, 204 (1936). See also Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. Pa. L. Rev. 76 (1909).
4. 3 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 6201-06 (3d. ed. F. Horack,
Jr. 1943, Supp. 1971).
5. P. Cross, Precedent in English Law 164-69 (2d ed. 1968).
6. K. LIewellyn, The Bramble Bush 78 (1930).
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One more thing I must mention before I leave these statutes: if they are local, terri-
torial in their effect, if they afford no ground for reasoning to the reservoir of law,
then when you meet a statute in a case, you can skate over it? . . . You cannot read
a statute like a case. There is no pleasant repetition of the same thought in different
forms. Each word stands there: You get it, or you miss the whole. There is nothing
that one dares to scant. There is little indeed of dictum in a statute. Eyes out, then,
for eac word of each statute that you meet! 7
As late as 1962, Professor Llewellyn apparently found little occasion
to modify his views as to the conservative (if not grudging) reception
given to statutes by many case-oriented American courts., Support for
his stance may be found in the fact that for years after the enactment of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), courts throughout
the United States decided negotiable instrument cases by completely ig-
noring the NIL in favor of common law casesY For some reason, the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code) has enjoyed a cordial accep-
tance in the courts. For example, the New York Court of Appeals in the
case of Greenberg v. Lorenz10 basically adopted section 2-318 of the UCC
one year before New York adopted the Code."1 In a similar vein, the
New Jersey Supreme Court in the famous case of Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.' 2 accepted the principle of unconscionability contained
in section 2-302 of the UCC one year before that state's adoption of the
Code. 3 In addition, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied the
principles of section 2-302, in its development of the common law, to a
fact situation which occurred prior to the adoption of the Code.14
This hospitable welcome to the Code before its adoption (or before its
effective date) in the various states has continued, and now American
courts seem almost zealous in extending the reach of Article 2 into non-
sales areas, in a manner not inconsistent with the prescient thoughts
of Dean Pound. The remainder of this article will attempt to show this
"extension by analogy" approach of the courts. Unfortunately, this
extension has not been consistent in all fields.
This article will not consider the extension of Article 2 to franchise
contracts or the application of the unconscionability principle of Article
2 to security transactions under Article 9.15
7. Id. at 80-81.
8. K. Llewellyn, jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 190, 222-29, 339 (1962).
9. W. Britton, Bills and Notes § 3, at 13-14 (2d ed. 1961).
10. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
11. New York adopted the-Uniform Commercial Code in 1962 (ch. 553, E1962J N.Y.
Laws 185th Sess. 2580) [The Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be cited as U.C.C.1.
12. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
13. Ch. 120, [1961) N.J. Acts 722.
14. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
15. As to franchise agreements see Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights
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II. IMlPLIED WARRANTY IN THE LEASE Or CHATTELS
The extensions by analogy-of the UCC's implied warranties of quality
to a lease of chattels was perhaps facilitated by the fact that some pre-
Code courts had held that a lessor of chattels impliedly warranted their
quality." Professor Gilmore (the draftsman of the Comments to the
Code) perhaps had these cases in mind when he stated that "the warranty
sections of this article are not designed in any way to disturb those
lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not
be confined ... to sales contracts .... They may arise in other appro-
priate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire .... M
It might be expected that courts would refer to this comment as a spring-
board for their analogies; this, however, is not universally so. In general,
the courts have been content to extend implied warranty concepts to chat-
tel leases either by ignoring the UCC or by misstating its provisions. For
example, in a case involving the lease of a "U-Haul" trailer, a lower
Pennsylvania court stated that "the authorities are uniform in holding
that the implied warranty arises in the case of a lease as freely as in the
case of a sale."' 8 The court did not cite the Code which had been in effect
for approximately eight years at the time of the decision; it was content
to rely on three Pennsylvania pre-Code cases.
In a somewhat similar vein, a lower New York trial court, in a case
involving a lease of an allegedly defective coffee vending machine, ap-
parently held that the controversy was controlled by sections 2-302,
2-316 and 9-206 of the Code without giving any authority or rationale
for the decision. 9 In Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Commodore Cosmetique,
Inc.,'0 a beauty parlor leased a coffee making machine for the convenience
of its customers. The lessor assigned its interests to Fairfield Lease Corp.,
and the beauty parlor refused to continue its rental payments when the
-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 Duke L.J. 465; Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises
and the Code-Mixing Classified and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. Law.
1075 (1967). For two very recent franchise-distributorship cases under the UCC, see
Spiering v. Fairmont Foods Co., 424 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1970); Division of the Triple T
Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y..2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
See also Conment, Unconscionability-The Code, the Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 367 (1968).
16. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev.
653 (1957).
17. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2. See also Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, Blood
Transfusions and the Warranty Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 943 (1968).
18. Henry v. Hostetler, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 614, 615 (Pa. C.P. Buds County 1966).
19. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 .UCC Rep. Serv. 858
(N.Y. Sup. CL 1966).
20. 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 164 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1969).
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vending machine failed to operate properly. The assignee of the lease
sued and the beauty shop claimed a breach of an implied warranty of fit-
ness for use under section 2-315 of the Code. The assignee then replied that
the lease provided that the beauty parlor would not raise this defense
against the assignee of the lease pursuant to section 9-206 of the Code. The
court first held that "with the placing of a vending machine in a shop such
as this goes an implied warranty of fitness to the extent that it would be
suitable for use for vending coffee with a minimal degree of care on the
part of the lessee."'" The court cited no authority for this holding. It further
stated that because of the close alliance between the assignor and the
assignee, the assignee would be estopped from enforcing the waiver
clause and finished with the statement that "[i]n making this decision
UCC § 9-206 was taken into consideration."2 2 It is to be noted that the
Code provides for the validation of waiver clauses in sale and lease
agreements: "[A] n agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the
seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee . . . ,,"1 The Comment to
this section notes that "[t]he same rules are made applicable to leases as
to security agreements, whether or not the lease is intended as security. ' 24
It seems to be the unarticulated premise of this court that this section has
the effect of applying the implied warranty sections of the Code to a lease.
A federal district court has held that the lessor of rental cars would
be liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness if the car had de-
fective brakes which caused injury; however, an injured third person
could not recover on this basis against the lessor because of an absence of
privity which was supposedly required by the laws of West Virginia, Vir-
ginia and Maryland, any one of whose laws might have governed re-
covery.2 5
The relatively recent cases of Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v.
Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc.20 and Sawyer v. Pioneer
Leasing Corp. involved similar facts and reached the same results. In
both cases machinery was leased for a period of five years; in Hertz the
lease could have been renewed at the end of the five year period for a
nominal yearly rental, while in Sawyer the evidence showed that the les-
sor would probably have sold the machinery to the lessee (at the expira-
tion of the lease) if a price could have been negotiated. In both cases it
21. Id. at 165-66.
22. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
23. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (emphasis added).
24. U.C.C. § 9-206, Comment 1.
25. Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671, 679-81 (D. Md. 1967).
26. 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
27. 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
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appeared that the lessee had to assume the cost of repairs and both leases
provided for a disclaimer of any implied warranties. Finally, both cases
involved allegedly defective machinery. The Hertz court, after citing sec-
tion 2-102 of the Code and various law review articles, relied heavily upon
Sawyer in holding that the implied warranty sections of the Code may
be applicable (depending upon the facts) to a lease or bailment of
goods, and that any disclaimer of a warranties clause in the lease must meet
the terms of section 2-316 as to conspicuous print, etc. It would be a mis-
take to assume that the Hertz and Sawyer cases held that the implied
warranty sections of Article 2 apply to all chattel leases; the real holding
in both cases can be summarized as follows:
We are holding that Section 85-2-316 (2) is applicable to leases where the provisions
of the lease are analogous to a sale. Here, the contract provides that the lessee shall
pay all expenses of repairs and maintenance.... The transaction really seems to be
a sale in every respect, except for the fact that the instrument provided that the ice
machine should be returned to the lessor.28
As the dissenting opinion in Sawyer pointed out,2 it may be very diffi-
cult in any particular case to determine when a lease is analogous to a
sale. What is the proper criterion to be applied-is it the length of the
term of the lease, the intention of the parties, the lessee's obligation to
repair, the lessee's ability to acquire title to the chattel at the end of the
term, or a combination of these factors? It should be noted that the Code
has adopted a relatively simple test to answer the similar problem of
whether a lease of chattels is intended to be a security interest.
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case;
however .. .an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the
lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no
additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one in-
tended for security.30
In effect, the Hertz and Sawyer courts have implicitly adopted a modi-
fied version of the above test along with other tests to determine whether
the lease is analogous to a sale; this would seem to be a roundabout way
of achieving a desired end. If the courts can adopt the implied warranty
provisions of the Code which are contained in Article 2, cannot the courts
also adopt an approach based upon section 1-201(37) to determine "is
this lease one intended for sale?"
A more important question remains-why must the courts find that the
lease resembles a sale before engrafting implied warranty concepts onto
its terms? Admittedly, this approach creates a pose of logic around the
28. Id. at 957, 428 S.W.2d at 54.
29. Id. at 958, 428 S.W.2d at 54.
30. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
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decision; it appears, however, to be a relatively small extension of the
law. Courts in other non-sale situations have adopted implied warranty
concepts without straining to correlate the particular transaction with a
sale. For example, once courts under an implied warranty theory have
allowed bystanders to recover for their injuries,3 or persons who are try-
ing out goods to recover for their injuries,32 the necessity for a "sale" has
vanished. As soon as a court has dispensed with the necessity of privity, it
has also dispensed with the necessity of a sale.
This grafting of Article 2 sales warranty concepts onto lease transac-
tions tends to create additional problems which are not always perceived
by the courts. For example, a New York trial court was confronted with
an airplane lease which provided that the lessor " 'makes no express or
implied warranties or representations as to any matter whatsoever, in-
cluding, without limitation, the condition of the aircraft, its merchant-
ability or its fitness for any particular purpose.' ,3 The lease provided
that it was governed by the law of Massachusetts, and the court stated
that the law of that state precluded the granting of a motion for sum-
mary judgement when the lessee asserted that this disclaimer clause was
unconscionable under section 2-302 of the Code. The court accepted
the assertion of the defense of unconscionability without recognizing
that a lease, rather than a sale, was involved. In addition, the court made
no reference to section 2-316 of the UCC, which might have invalidated
the disclaimer as a matter of law without any testimony, while in deciding
the question of unconscionability a court must allow the introduction of
testimony. 4 In effect, the court made more work for itself by an incom-
plete analysis of the problem. In a somewhat similar approach, the Mu-
nicipal Court of the City of Boston held section 2-302 of the Code
applicable to invalidate a clause in a truck lease which purported to make
the lessee liable for loss regardless of fault. The court, however, also held
that it was error for the trial judge to make a finding of unconscionability
without giving the parties the opportunity to present evidence and re-
manded the case for a new trial.35
31. E.g., Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968), noted In 23 U.
Miami L. Rev. 266 (1968).
32. E.g., Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
33. Electronics Corp. of America v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066, 1067, 286
N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
34. U.C.C. § 2-302(2). Another New York court has applied the unconscionability rule of
Article 2 to police a lease of a coffee vending machine. The court held that a lease which
provided that the lessor could repossess the leased chattel and accelerate all unaccrued and
unearned rent if the lessee should violate any clause of the agreement, even though It
was a trivial default under the entire lease, would be struck down as an attempt to
exact a penalty. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1181 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1970).
35. E.F. Lynch, Inc. v. Piccirimi, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 49 (Boston Man. Ct. 1964).
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In a recent Florida case, a lessee rented (on a month to month basis) a
forklift to remove wheel chair passengers from its aircraft. The lessor
knew the proposed use to be made of the forklift and performed mainte-
nance and repair under the terms of the lease. The forklift dropped a
wheel chair passenger who recovered damages from the airline-lessee,
which then sought damages from the lessor for breach of warranty of
fitness. The Supreme Court of Florida paraphrased section 2-315 of the
Code and held that:
The general rule can be stated as follows: In the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, where the lessor has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
leased chattel is required and that the lessee is relying upon the lessors skill or judg-
ment to select or furnish a suitable chattel, there is an implied warranty that the
chattel shall be fit for such purpose.30
The court was careful to note that a warranty of fitness will not arise
in all lease transactions. Whether that warranty would arise may depend
upon whether the lessor possessed or should have possessed expertise in
the characteristics of the leased chattel, whether the lessee's reliance upon
the lessor's selection of a suitable chattel was commercially reasonable,
whether the lessor was a mass dealer in the leased chattel or if the trans-
action was an isolated occurrence.
The majority of courts will eventually adopt the view that the germane
sections of Article 2 will apply to all leases of chattels on the basis that all
such leases are "analogous" to sales of chattels. From the standpoint of the
consumer-user, is there any real commercial difference between leasing a
car for a year or buying a new one each year? Is there any real economic
difference to a businessman between leasing office equipment for a period
of a few years or buying new office equipment every few years? Of course,
there are legal differences between leasing and buying chattels3 7 However,
to allow the lease-sale distinction to preclude recovery based upon war-
ranty can only be justified by preserving arcane distinctions which have
lost their social utility.
The view that the majority of courts will apply Article 2 to all chattel
leases is not extreme. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service3" reached this point six years ago.
In Cintrone, the plaintiff passenger was injured when the brakes failed
on a truck leased to his employer. Hertz performed continuing mainte-
nance on the truck, but the court's opinion failed to mention the terms of
the lease. The court stated that the public offering of rental vehicles
necessarily implies a representation that they are fit for operation during
36. W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970),
aff'g 227 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
37. L. Void, Sales § 4, at 24-25 (2d ed. 1959).
38. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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the agreed rental period 9 and that this warranty or representation of
fitness is independent of the lessor's maintenance obligations. 40 The court
extended the coverage of this warranty to the plaintiff-employee. 4 ' With
the question of warranty settled, a court should have little difficulty in
assaulting the "citadel of privity" thereby extending the protection of
the lease warranty to a noncontracting party.
III. IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF NEW HOMES
Although the Supreme Court of the United States held in 1884 that
there was an implied warranty of quality in the sale by a contractor of
"false work" which was for construction of a bridge,42 the majority com-
mon law view in the United States was that a contractor-vendor did not
impliedly warrant his structural improvements to land.43 This caveat
emptor concept prevailed long after the implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness had developed in the sale of chattels both by case de-
cision and by statute.4 4
The first gradual departure from the view that the builder-vendor did
not impliedly warrant the quality of his house appeared in a 1930 English
decision. In Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd. the court stated in dictum
that a builder-vendor who sold a partially completed house during the
course of construction impliedly warranted that it would be completed in
an efficient and workmanlike manner, that proper materials would be
used and that the house would be fit for human habitation. 40 In 1937, the
English Court of Appeal expressly followed the Miller dictum and held
that in the sale of a house under construction there is an implied warranty
that the house will be finished in a workmanlike manner.4 7 The court
strove to find that the house was not complete at the time of sale since
there would be no warranty in the sale of a completed house. This view
appears to be the present day English rule.48 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma and an Ohio appellate court have expressly followed the
English view in the sale of a partially completed house, holding that
39. Id. at 446-47, 212 A.2d at 775-76.
40. Id. at 451, 212 A.2d at 778.
41. Id. at 457, 212 A..2d at 781.
42. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884).
43. See authorities cited note 65 infra.
44. Sale of Goods Act of 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, §§ 13-15; Uniform Sales Act §§ 14-16
(superseded by U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315). See generally J. Benjamin, A Treatise on the Law
of Sale of Personal Property 609-60 (8th ed. 1950).
45. [1931] 2 K.B. 113. It would appear that the case was decided on express warranty
grounds and the discussion of an implied warranty was, therefore, dictum.
46. Id. at 122.
47. Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [19371 4 All E.R. 390 (CA.).
48. See Hancock v. B.W. Brazier (Anerley) Ltd., [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1317 (C.A.).
[Vol. 39
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there is an implied warranty that the builder-vendor "would construct the
house in a good and workmanlike manner and reasonably fit for occu-
pancy as a place of abode,"'4 9 or would complete "the entire house
in such a way that it would be reasonably fit for its intended use, and
that the work would be done in a reasonably efficient and workmanlike
manner. 50 It must be stated, however, that the Supreme Court of Ohio
refused to follow the view (previously enunciated by the lower court)
that there is an implied warranty in the sale of an incomplete residence
which is subsequently completed by the general contractor. The court
inadequately distinguished (or qualified) the decision of the Ohio ap-
pellate court, and then flatly stated:
We are of the opinion that the paucity of reported decisions involving an authentic
common-law implied warranty involving real estate sales indicates that the doctrine
of caveat emptor is so ingrained in our customary real estate transactions that few,
if any, attempts have been made to pierce the shield of protection from specious
claims of defect which it affords to vendors, not only of older buildings but of newly
completed structures. 51
There is a medieval flavor to reasoning which seems to imply that claims
against builders must be spurious and that it is the court's task to pro-
tect the innocent land developer. It would appear that Oklahoma has not
been confronted with a case involving the sale of a completed house, but
it is probable that it will extend its holding in Jones v. Gaze-wood 2 to
cover a completed dwelling when the case arises."3
With the exception of five states which adopted the Code in the fifties,
the UCC was adopted in 46 jurisdictions between the years 1961 and
1968.-1 In the last decade the states of Arkansas, 5 Colorado,5 Idaho,"7
49. Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158, 159 (Okla. 1963); accord, Hoye v. Century
Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P2d 474 (1958). Washington has subsequently extended
the warranty to include a completed house sold by the builder. See House v. Thornton, 76
Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
50. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 342, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1957);
accord, Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Mfisc. 2d 322, 329-30, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544, 551-52 (Sup.
Ct. 1965) (dictum).
51. Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 71, 218 N.E.2d 594, 598 (1966).
52. 381 P.2d 158 (Okda. 1963).
53. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83-84, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964) ; Rothberg
v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461, 467 (Vt. 1970), which discounted any difference as to the implied
warranty between purchasing a completed house and one which is being constructed.
54. Uniform Commercial Code, Table 1, at 5 (Supp. 1970).
55. Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970).
56. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); see Glisan v. Smolenshe,
153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963) which implied a warranty in the purchase of a house
under construction.
57. In Bethlilhmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966), the house was not
completed at the time of the purchase.
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Illinois,5 8 Kentucky, 9 New Jersey,"0 South Dakota,0 ' Texas, 2 Vermont, 3
and Washington"' have held that the builder-vendor of a new home gives
some species of implied warranty to the original buyer. These jurisdic-
tions have justified these warranties by analogy to the implied warranties
present in the sale of goods and have relied upon a series of law review
articles"s advocating this growth from the sale of goods analogy.
It is interesting to note that the courts have imposed this warranty
responsibility upon the builder-vendor regardless of whether he is a
mass production builder6" or a relatively small contractor.0 7 The old
phobia of bankrupting the small entrepreneur, articulated in the older
manufacturing cases, 8 has evidently disappeared. It is also significant
that the vast majority of the cases involved some manner of ground-
settling or ground-water drainage problems which caused the homes to
be truly uninhabitable.69
Since the courts have created this warranty, it is not surprising that
the phrasing of the standard has varied. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has defined this warranty as an "implied obligation of reasonable work-
manship and habitability,"70 while the Colorado Supreme Court has stated
that "[w]here, as here, a home is the subject of sale, there are implied
warranties that the home was built in [a] workmanlike manner and is
suitable for habitation."171 Illinois has characterized the warranty as one
58. Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962),
involved a sale of an incomplete dwelling.
59. Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969).
60. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
61. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
62. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Moore v. Werner, 418 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
63. Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt. 1970).
64. House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
65. E.g., Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule,
14 Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1961); Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a
Particular Purpose, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 108 (1953); Haskell, The Case for an Implied
Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 Geo. L.J. 633 (1965); Roberts, The
Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 Cornell L.Q. 835
(1967). Professor Jaeger's edition of Williston on Contracts also has had an influence upon
the courts. See 7 S. Williston, Contracts §§ 926, 926A (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963).
66. E.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
67. E.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
68. E.g., Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912).
69. E.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154
Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) (by implication); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.
1970).
70. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 93, 207 A.2d 314, 327 (1965).
71. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83-84, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964).
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in which the builder warrants that it is "a house fit for habitation, ' 72 and
Texas holds that the builder-vendor "impliedly warrant[s] that such
house was constructed in a good workmanlike manner and was suitable
for human habitation[.] " 73 Some courts have been careful to stipulate
that the builder-vendor does not warrant that he is selling a "perfect"
house;74 unfortunately, the concepts of "workmanlike" and "habitable"
are not as precise as the word "perfect." In short, it is simple to express
what the builder is not warranting, but it may be difficult to express what
he is warranting. For example, if we assume that a house has settled and
is continuing to settle with a resulting upheaval of floors, cracking of the
walls and the roof structure, it is simple to hold that the house is not
habitable and that it was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. The
word "uninhabitable" necessarily includes the concept of unworkmanlike
when construction defects are in issue. However, there may be unwork-
manlike construction in the erection of a house which does not result in
uninhabitability. The courts' joining of the concepts of "unworkmanlike
manner" and "habitability" with the conjunction "and" has served to
confuse the issue. If the case involves a house which is "habitable" in
the dictionary sense of being "fit to live in," it may have many defects
which could be characterized as the result of unworkmanlike construction,
but this might not meet the definition of the builder-vendor's "implied
obligation of reasonable workmanship and habitability." In brief, these
two standards ought to be separated by the disjunctive "or," rather than
the conjunctive "and," in order to avoid any inference that the builder-
vendor's implied warranty of quality is considerably less than the mer-
chant-seller's implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods.m
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court's statement that "major defects
which render the house unfit for habitation, and which are not readily
remediable, entitle the buyer to rescission and restitution,"70 seems too
restrictive of the buyer's rights.
It has been suggested that the implied warranty of merchantability in
the sale of homes should also be imposed against the owner-vendor of
used homes.77 Should an implied warranty be imposed against a non-pro-
72. Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 388, 184 N.E.2d 728, 731
(1962).
73. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968).
74. E.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966); Waggoner v.
Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967).
75. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
76. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966).
77. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53
Geo. L.J. 633, 649-52 (1965). The argument seems to be based upon the notion that when
a person pays what would be a large sum of money for a used home there is a basic
19711 ARTICLE 2
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
fessional who is selling a used product? Although the Code is neutral,
many courts have held under pre-Code law that there is no implied war-
ranty of merchantability in the sale of used goods by a non-merchant. 7
However, at least one court has held that a merchant who sells used
merchandise will be deemed to have impliedly warranted its quality.7'
It is all very well to worry about the layman-buyer whose pocketbook
may be hurt by the purchase of a defective home, but one should also
consider the pocketbook of the innocent layman-seller who may be subject
to liability years after the sale of his house and who may have no effective
recourse against a long defunct contractor-seller. If there is to be liability
imposed, it ought to be imposed against an aware layman-seller who
fails to disclose serious latent defects to an unwary buyer.8 0 Liability
should be confined to a fault basis.
The majority of the cases imposing an implied warranty upon the
builder-vendor have involved suits between the builder and his buyer; only
one case, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,81 involved a non-buyer plaintiff.
In Schipper, the original buyer leased his home and a young child of the
lessees was scalded as a result of an allegedly defective water heater
control device. The court, after holding that the builder-vendor may be
liable on an implied warranty basis, also held that inasmuch as the
necessity of privity is rapidly disappearing from the products liability
area, it should not "revivify the requirement of privity' 8 2 in this area
when a lessee sues the builder.
Cognizant of the above cases, some sophisticated building contractors in
Miami, Florida (and probably elsewhere as well) have commenced
using form home building contracts which carefully articulate certain
express warranties and carefully disclaim all implied warranties in ac-
cordance with section 2-316 of the Code. These same contracts carefully
negate any liability for consequential and incidental damages and para-
phrase almost all applicable sections of Article 2. It would appear,
therefore, that the courts will soon have to determine the limits of en-
croachment of Article 2 into the sale of new homes.
It has been suggested that there may be little practical effect of this new
application of implied warranty concepts into the sale of homes due to
assumption of quality that the vendee should and does expect to receive. The extent of
the warranty should not be related to the purchase price of the house.
78. See 1 S. Williston, Sales §§ 232-33a (rev. ed. 1948).
79. Brown v. Hall, 221 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Enix v. Diamond T.
Sales & Serv. Co., 188 So. 2d 48, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 195 So. 2d 566
(Fla. 1966). Both of these cases involved pre-Code law.
80. See, e.g., Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. 2d 465, 467-68, 423
P.2d 926, 927-28 (1967) ; U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3.
81. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
82. Id. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328.
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the limited financial resources of so many home builders in the United
States;83 for every Levitt & Sons, there are probably hundreds of small
builders. In addition to this fact, it is simple for the more solvent builder
to create a number of "thin" corporations and to have each development
built by one of these modestly endowed entities. By the time the dust
has settled, the disgruntled homeowner will discover that he has a worth-
less judgment.
An additional problem presented by this judicial creation of an implied
warranty is what is the statute of limitations for the action and what are
its termini? Section 2-725 of the UCC provides a limitation period of
four years (which may be reduced by contract to no less than one year).
The period begins to run from the date of tender of delivery "except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods
and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been dis-
covered."' 4 In none of the cases mentioned thus far have the courts had
to directly confront this problem. One case has stated that the imposition
of implied warranty liability upon the builder-vendor does not make him
an insurer " 'of all who thereafter come upon the premises,' "5 but the
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the house was defective when it
was constructed and sold. Another court noted that the duration of
liability is determined by the standard of reasonableness."0 It is ventured
that the majority of the courts will adopt the view of the UCC and hold
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the tender of possession
of the house to the first buyer by the builder-vendor. The question of the
length of the statutory period will present a more difficult problem. The
courts will have to either adopt the four year period specified in section
2-725, or characterize a breach of warranty case as either a "tort" or a
"contract" action and then follow the applicable tort or contract limitation
statute of the jurisdiction.8 7
IV. IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF HABITABILITY AND
FITNESS IN THE LEASE OF RENTAL PROPERTY
It has been the general rule for centuries that the tenant of real property
has been subject to the illegitimate maxim of caveat emptor.8" The
tenant was supposed to examine the premises; if he was in doubt about
83. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It,
52 Cornell L.Q. 835, 868 (1967).
84. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
85. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
86. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So. 2d 374 (FL-. Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
88. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1133, 1156-87 (1931).
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the condition, he was to secure an express warranty or assume the risk
of all defects, latent or patent. A few Anglo-American courts have held in
relatively old cases that a short term lease for a furnished dwelling may
contain an implied warranty of habitability.80 These cases failed to pro-
duce any viable offspring until the 1961 Wisconsin case of Pines v. Pers-
sionY0 In Pines, a lessor leased an uninhabitable house (uninhabitable
because of filth and defective plumbing, heating and wiring systems)
to a number of college students who vacated the furnished residence
within a few days after their initial occupancy. The lessees knew of the
obvious filth, but they did not know of the plumbing, heating and wiring
defects. The lessees brought suit to recover their rental deposit, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that they were entitled to a return of the
deposit (less the reasonable rental value for the period of actual occu-
pancy) on the basis of the lessor's breach of an implied warranty of
habitability in the lease. The court, in reasoning for the creation of this
implied warranty, made no reference to the law of sales. Rather, it
noted that legislative enactments and administrative rules, building codes
and health regulations all impose certain duties on a property owner with
respect to the condition of the leased premises, and that to follow the
old common law rule of no implied warranty in leases would be incon-
sistent with this legislative policy. This view was expressly followed in
1967 by a lower California court, which apparently held that a California
statute (requiring the lessor to put and maintain the leased premises
in a condition fit for occupancy) required the court to hold that a
lease contains an implied warranty of habitability which would be
breached when the evidence showed the apartment to be infested with
vermin."' In the same year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held in Horton v. Marston,92 that the lease of a furnished summer cottage
for a term of nine months contained an implied covenant that the cottage
"and its furnishings were then suitable for their intended use."0 3 The
lessor was held liable for breach of this covenant when the stove exploded
injuring the tenant. The court had to contend with the case of Ingalls v.
Hobbs,9 4 which had held that when a lessor leased a dwelling for a short
term (the summer season), the landlord would be held to an implied
agreement that the dwelling was suitable for immediate occupancy, with-
89. The history is succinctly reviewed in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444,
251 A.2d 268 (1969) and Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
90. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Pines v. Perssion has been followed In
Bonner v. Beechem, 2 CCH Pov. L. Rep. ff 11,098 (Denver County Ct. 1970).
91. Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. 1967).
92. 352 Mass. 322, 225 N.E.2d 311 (1967)
93. Id. at 326, 225 N.E.2d at 313.
94. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
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out any necessity for the lessee's undergoing any expense in preparing the
dwelling for use. Moreover, the lessor would have breached this implied
covenant if he leased a dwelling which was infested with vermin. In
Horton the court was of the view that a nine month lease would fall
within the Ingalls holding.
Horton is an example of a court attempting to appear consistent by the
slight extension of precedent which in itself was a "sleight-of-hand" effort
to evade the common law caveat emptor rule without giving the ap-
pearance of failing to follow precedent. It would have been more forth-
right for the court simply to have held that every lease of a dwelling con-
tains an implied warranty that the premises are suitable for occupancy.
Courts, however, must often legislate through the charade of following
precedent in order to soften the blow to a well established principle.
The Wisconsin view received a dramatic adoption and extension in New
Jersey, where the supreme court of that state imposed an implied war-
ranty "that the premises are suitable for the leased purposes and conform
to local codes and zoning laws""r5 in a lease for a commercial office build-
ing. The New Jersey court recognized that the Wisconsin case of Pines v.
Perssion dealt with dwelling quarters, but apparently saw no difficulty
in extending the rule to commercial property. Within one year after this
decision, the same court, in the case of Marini v. Ireland,O implied a cove-
nant against latent defects-that the premises were habitable and fit for
living-in a lease of residential property. The court was careful to articu-
late that a dwelling lease impliedly contains a covenant that at the incep-
tion of the lease there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of
the premises for residential purposes because of faulty original construc-
tion or deterioration from age or normal usage. This implied covenant
further provides that the rented facilities will remain in usable condition
during the entire term of the lease. If the landlord fails to maintain the
premises, the tenant may either claim a constructive eviction or, as in
95. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969). The
evidence in this case disclosed that the tenant was initially unaware that the office was
subject to water seepage (through the foundation) during rain storms. The court stated
that "at the inception of the original lease in the present case, an implied warranty
against latent defects existed." Id. at 455, 251 A.2d at 274. The tenant soon discovered this
defect, and the manager of the premises repeatedly attempted to correct the leak
without complete success. The tenant renewed the lease in reliance upon the manager's
promises to correct; unfortunately, the manager died without correcting the leak and
the lessee vacated the premises. The court held that the implied warranty against latent
defects was breached, that the lessor breached its covenant of quiet enjoyment, and that
the lessee was constructively evicted and was not responsible for payment of rent
subsequent to the eviction.
96. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). See also Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc, 63
Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
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this case, repair the defect and then deduct the reasonable cost of repairs
from the rental payments. The unusual approach of this court is note-
worthy-the warranty of habitability is not confined to the notion of
constructive eviction. To the ghetto dweller who lacks the mobility in-
digenous to the middle and the upper classes, constructive eviction is not
an effective remedy. The only pragmatic enforcement of the warranty
lies in the court-created right to repair and to deduct the cost from the
rent.
Eleven days prior to the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Marini v. Ireland, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided that an implied warranty of habitability is contained
in all leases of residential property. 7 The court expressly followed the
consumer warranty cases and extended their rationale by analogy to
reshape much of the law of landlord and tenant. The housing regulations
of the District of Columbia were used by the court as a standard for de-
termining the meaning of the concept of "habitability." This court also
reached the conclusion that the normal remedies for a breach of contract
should be applicable in the event of a breach of the warranty and that
the tenant should not be limited solely to constructive eviction.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in the recent case of Lemle v. Breeden,"8
has enunciated a sound rationale for the judicial imposition of a war-
ranty of habitability in a lease of real property. The lessor leased a
home (apparently furnished) which had a thatched roof and unscreened
doors and windows. An advanced state of rat infestation required aban-
donment of the premises three days after the lessee's initial occupancy.
After reviewing the historical background negating the implication of
warranties in the lease of real estate, the court stated:
In the law of sales of chattels, the trend is markedly in favor of implying warranties
of fitness and merchantability. See W. Prosser, Torts §§ 95, 97 (3d ed. 1964). The
reasoning has been (1) that the public interest in safety and consumer protection
requires it, and (2) that the burden ought to be shifted to the manufacturer who, by
placing the goods on the market, represents their suitability and fitness.00
The court then continued:
The manufacturer is also the one who knows more about the product and is in a
better position to alleviate any problems or bear the brunt of any losses .... This
reasoning has also been accepted by a growing number of courts in cases involving
sales of new homes .... The same reasoning is equally persuasive in leases of real
property.10o
97. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
98. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
99. Id. at -, 462 P.2d at 473.
100. Id. at -, 462 P.2d at 474.
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Within a month after the decision in Lemle, the same court held that
there was an implied warranty of habitability in a lease of an unfurnished
home: "Today we hold that an implied warranty of habitability exists in
unfurnished as well as furnished dwellings.' 1'
It may be interesting to speculate as to why some courts have had to use
legislative enactments and building codes as the predicate for, or source
of, the implied warranty of habitability in a lease of real property. The
common law development of the implied warranty in the sale of goods
was not grounded upon legislation setting minimum standards of quality
for manufactured goods. Why should the courts (or at least some of them)
require a legislative source when dealing with real estate? Are some of
these courts stating in an inarticulate manner that they are not now
"making" law but rather implementing the law created by legislative or
quasi-legislative bodies? To a certain extent this view may be justified.
Most building codes do not give any cause of action to the aggrieved
citizen; enforcement is left in the hands of a city or county building de-
partment and "enforcement" is of little moment to the tenant if the viola-
tion is discovered subsequent to his occupancy of the building. In effect,
this creation of an implied warranty of habitability is putting a civil en-
forcement weapon in the hands of the one who really has an interest in en-
forcing the building codes and who would have little redress without it.
On the other hand, the interweaving of the building codes into an
implied warranty (or vice versa) may be a mistake. For example, it is
quite possible for a building to be a massive example of bad workmanship
without violating the applicable building code or regulations. The house
may be "unmerchantable" in the sense that it is not of fair average quality
but not "unsafe" in the building code sense. If the building codes are
used as a floor rather than a ceiling, then there may not be any ob-
jection to this approach. In addition, some of the courts may have been too
restrictive in defining the lessor's warranty in terms of "inhabitability." It
is true that not all the cases reviewed in this article involve "inhabita-
bility" as the central issue, and, of course, courts tailor their decisions to
the facts. However, what will result when cases arise involving leased
premises which are in disrepair but which fall short of the description of
uninhabitable? The courts may hold that since the premises are not un-
inhabitable, the lessee has not been constructively evicted and that he
is liable for the rental payments under the lease. The latter result is the
logical outgrowth of interlinking "uninhabitability" with "constructive
eviction"-it is an all or nothing approach which results when one at-
tempts to infiltrate a new principle into an old legal structure without
101. Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, -, 462 P.2d 482, 483 (1969).
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discarding some of the old principles." 2 This approach would continue the
distinction between the buyer of a chattel who can revoke his acceptance
and recapture his purchase price in the event that material latent defects
subsequently appear even though the chattel may have some utility,'
and the lessee who is not able to revoke his acceptance of a leasehold and
recapture his rent or resist paying additional rent in the event that ma-
terial latent defects subsequently appear unless they render the premises
uninhabitable. It would be rather difficult to explain this practical incon-
sistency to anybody but a lawyer who is acclimated to distinctions.
Courts which wish to avoid this indefensible position have two alternate
routes: (a) in order to maintain a mantle of consistency and to reach
the "right" result, some courts may stretch the definition of "uninhabi-
tability" to include most defects, but this might in turn place a higher
standard upon landlords than upon suppliers of chattels; or, (b) courts
may forthrightly admit that they are imposing some hybrid species of a
warranty of merchantability-fitness upon lessors which will enable lessees
to recover damages (normally in the form of a diminution of rent) from
the lessor or a complete elimination of the lessee's liability for rent in the
event that the premises are uninhabitable. The New Jersey Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have evi-
dently adopted the latter approach. 0 4
V. SERVICE CONTRACTS AND ARTICLE 2
Although it is relatively ancient law that there is an implied warranty
of merchantability in an orthodox sale of goods by a merchant to a con-
sumer,'0 5 there is no definitive answer when the contract is a hybrid com-
posed of a "sale" of goods and a "service" such as delivering the goods to
a consumer or applying the goods to the body of a consumer. Many courts
held under the common law and the Uniform Sales Act that the "sale" of
food in a restaurant was not a sale, but rather the rendering of a service
with the result that an injured patron of the restaurant could not recover
for injuries caused by impurities in the food.' 06 As a result of this "sale-
service" dichotomy it was quite possible that a patron who ate impure
food in a restaurant could not recover on an implied warranty theory,
while his neighbors who purchased the same food for consumption at
home could recover; in the former case the "service" aspect was deemed to
102. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 VWis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); note 95 supra.
103. U.C.C. § 2-608.
104. See Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); note 95
supra.
105. Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects: A Historical Comparative Law
Study, 21 La. L. Rev. 586 (1961); see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40
Yale L.J. 1133 (1931).
106. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 5.
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predominate, while in the latter case, the "sale" aspect predominated.0'0
This artificial distinction was fortunately obliterated in the sale of food
cases by the UCC, which provides that "the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale."I' s
Unfortunately, this abolition of the sale-service distinction in food
cases was not expressly extended by the Code to include cases involving
the application of products to the exterior or interior of the human body,
even though the situations are analogousl °a For example, if the sale of a
bottle of permanent wave hair lotion imposes an implied warranty of
merchantability upon the retailer, should not the application of the same
lotion by a beauty parlor impose the same kind of warranty upon the
beauty parlor? The basic problem is the same whether it is food or hair
wave lotion; however, many courts have not seen the parallel. These
courts have held that when the transfer of title (the sale) to products
such as hair lotion is incidental to the service which is the predominant
aspect of the transaction, there cannot be an implied warranty under the
Code.1 '
It is hoped that the case of Newmark v. Gimbet's Ihw.jwill put the
quietus to these ill-considered "beauty parlor" cases. In this case the
plaintiff relied upon a Gimbel's beautician's recommendation of a perma-
nent wave lotion. The lotion caused harm, and the plaintiff based her suit
upon breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The court
stated that any distinction between a sale and the rendition of services is a
highly artificial one. The court rejected the argument of Gimbel's that the
effect of applying the lotion served to lessen its liability as compared with
an outright sale of the lotion in its original container.
The transaction, in our judgment, is a hybrid partaking of incidents of a sale and a
service. It is really partly the rendering of service, and partly the supplying of goods
for a consideration. Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Division that an implied
warranty of fitness of the products used in giving the permanant wave exists with no
less force than it would have in the case of a simple sale. Obviously in permanant
wave operations the product is taken into consideration in fixing the price of the
107. See discussion in Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407
(1918) ; L. Void, Sales § 94, at 453-54 (2d ed. 1959).
108. U.C.C. § 2-314(l).
109. The court in Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 278, 156 S.E.2d 923,
924 (1967) (a case dealing with blood and serum hepatitis) noted that "we think it is
significant that the General Assembly expressly provided that the 'serving for value of food
or drink... is a sale' of goods ... without expressly including other service-type transactions
as covered by any implied warranty."
110. E.g., Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963);
Cassina v. Morris M. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 1148 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964).
111. 54 NJ. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
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service. The no-separate-charge argument puts excessive emphasis on form and down-
grades the overall substance of the transaction.1 1 2
The service-sale distinction reaches its full development in the cases in-
volving blood transfusion and the medical use of surgical nails and appli-
ances. It was the majority view prior to the Code that when blood
transfusions were administered by a hospital as part of the medical treat-
ment of a patient, the service aspect of the medical treatment predomi-
nated over the incidental transfer of title to the blood even though the
blood may have been separately itemized. In effect, the transfer of title to
the blood was merely incidental to the medical service contract which was
a contract for work, labor and materials. Hence there was no sale, and
without a sale, there could not be any implied warranty of the quality of
the blood.113 Inasmuch as the Code does not expressly touch upon the
problem, it is not surprising that the majority of courts have continued
to adhere to this service-sale dichotomy since the adoption of the Code,
and have continued to deny that there is any implied warranty in the
sale of blood whether it be by a hospital or by a blood bank to a hos-
pital.1 4 Florida," 5 California," 6 Massachusetts," 7 and Arizona 8 have
provided by statute that blood (including blood plasma) shall not be con-
sidered as an object subject to sale but as a medical service. Florida and
Massachusetts further provide that the implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness shall not be applicable.
The Florida statute was adopted because two Florida district courts of
appeal" 9 and the Florida Supreme Court'2 ° had held that the furnishing
of blood by a blood bank was a "sale" and the sales transaction would be
subject to an implied warranty if medical testimony showed that serum
112. Id. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701 (citation omitted).
113. The New York case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E.2d 792 (1954) is the landmark case for the court-created rule immunizing hospitals.
It has been followed by a majority of the cases and criticized by most legal writers. See
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967), rev'd
per curiam, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501,
267 A.2d 867 (1970) for a list of the authorities.
114. E.g., Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967);
Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
115. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.2-316(5) (Supp. 1970).
116. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1606 (West 1970).
117. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1969).
118. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1970).
119. Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Russell v. Community
Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla.
1967). Both cases stated the furnishing of blood by a hospital would be a "service"
while the furnishing of blood by a blood bank would be a "sale."
120. Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
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hepatitis could have been detected. Conversely, the courts stated that if
serum hepatitis could not have been detected then there would not be a
breach of warranty. The Florida statute states that "the implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose shall not be ap-
plicable as to a defect that cannot be detected or removed by reasonable
use of scientific procedures or techniques."'' This statutory theme that
warranty liability should not be imposed when it is impossible for the
supplier of the blood (whether blood bank or hospital) to detect the de-
fect can be found in numerous cases in other states -1 2  and is the real reason
why the courts have held that the furnishing of blood is a service and not
a sale. The courts have had to devise a method of protecting the blood
suppliers from legal liability incurred in the supplying of this essential
commodity, and this judicial reasoning of "no sale but a service" was the
only avenue open. If the courts had characterized the furnishing of blood
as a sale, then liability in implied warranty would seemingly have followed
as an inevitable consequence, since the law is well established that the
inability of the supplier (whether manufacturer or retailer) to detect
the defect in his product is no defense to a breach of warranty action."
In effect, the courts have said to manufacturers and retailers: "You sup-
ply most products at your own risk and you will be liable for defects
regardless of fault. If, however, you supply blood or blood plasma you
will be liable only if you are in fact at fault."
It would appear that only courts in Florida,12 1 New Jersey,12 5 and New
York1' 8 have characterized the furnishing of blood for a consideration as
a "sale." (But then Florida, as noted above, by judicial legislation fol-
lowed by orthodox legislative enactment, has exonerated blood suppliers
from the usual rule of liability in implied warranty without fault.) In
New Jersey, an appellate court found in favor of a supplier, on the
grounds that the supplier had probably disclaimed, under section 2-316 of
the Code, any implied warranty of merchantability even though the court
held that the furnishing of the blood was a "sale."'12 7 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 28 that court held that the record in the
121. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 6722-316(5) (Supp. 1970).
122. See discussion in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hasp., 90 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879
(Super. Ct. 1967), rev'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); 2 L. Frumer & M.
Friedman, Products Liability 3-49 (1970).
123. 1 S. Williston, Sales §§ 237 & 237-a (rev. ed. 1948).
124. See cases cited notes 119 & 120 supra.
125. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. CL 1967),
rev'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
126. Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.YS.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
127. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct 1967),
rev'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
128. Jackson v. Mublenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
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lower courts was inadequate and that a full trial and the preparation of
an adequate record would be needed before the court could decide if an
implied warranty would arise in the supplying of blood. Although it is
not entirely clear, it would appear that the court tacitly assumed that the
transfer of the blood for a consideration constituted a "sale." It must be
noted, however, that the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court recently interpreted this decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court as holding that there could not be a "sale" in the transfer of blood
by a hospital, and, as a result, there could not be any implied warranty
liability of a hospital for furnishing blood allegedly mismatched as to type
by the hospital causing the death of the patient. 2 " This court misread the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision and also failed to distinguish between
a case involving serum hepatitis and mismatched blood. 130 Finally, the
court was overly conservative in requiring that there be a "sale" before
there can be a warranty. The dissenting opinion' 11 correctly noted that
the New Jersey Supreme Court had not held that there could not be a
sale in the transfer of blood. The dissent further stated that if a beauty
parlor could be held liable on the basis of an implied warranty for a de-
fective hair lotion, as held by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Newmark
v. Gimbel's Inc., 132 then a hospital should be held liable on the same basis
for the furnishing of mismatched blood. The dissent further noted that
the New Jersey Supreme Court's dictum in Newmark that the doctrine of
strict liability will not be extended to doctors and dentists would not be
applicable to immunize a hospital. One New York court has aligned itself
with the New Jersey and Florida courts in holding that the supplying of
blood to a hospital by a commercial blood bank is a "sale" under section
2-106(1) of the UCC.'3 3 The court, however, then proceeded to "legis-
late" its holding out of existence by stating:
While on the face of the pleadings in the instant case there seems to exist a cause of
action for breach of warranty, this court feels that the approach taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp. is correct. All factors in re-
gard to public policy must be considered and there must be a weighing of interest
between the unfortunate patients who contract the disease and the general public who
are in constant need of blood from these commercial blood banks. There should be a
record developed at trial . . . before this court can say whether there should or
should not be liability cast upon commercial blood banks in serum hepatitis cases.
129. Baptista v. St. Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (Super.
Ct. 1970).
130. It may be impossible to detect serum hepatitis, but the matching of blood Is a
routine laboratory activity.
131. 109 N.J. Super. at 225, 262 A.2d at 907 (Conford, J., dissenting).
132. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
133. Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
But cf. Heitner v. City of New York, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
Although the Legislature should express the State's policy in this area the
courts are also capable of considering public policy in reaching decisions.la
4
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a recent case, has perceived
that the true issue in these blood cases is not whether the furnishing of
blood is a sale or a service, but rather whether courts should impose some
kind of implied warranty of quality in this "non-sales" setting. In
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital,3 ' the complaint alleged that a patient
received a transfusion of blood partially supplied by a blood bank and
that this blood contained serum hepatitis which eventually caused the
patient's death. The complaint was dismissed as failing to state a cause
of action on the ground that the furnishing of blood is not a sale. The
supreme court reversed, noting that it had held in numerous pre-Code
cases that implied warranties would exist in non-sales cases and that the
Code was not designed to impede this development. The court stated
that:
We therefore do not feel obligated to hinge any resolution of the very important issue
here raised on the technical existence of a sale.... In view of our case law implying
warranties in non-sales transactions, it cannot be said with certainty that no recovery
134. 60 Misc. 2d at 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02 (citations omitted).
135. 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970). Subsequent to the writing of this article, the
Supreme Court of Illinois in Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem. Hosp., - Ill -, - N.E2d -
(1970), applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1966) and held that a hospital
which supplies blood for a charge is strictly liable to its patient for injuries resulting from
blood which contains serum hepatitis virus. Section 402A provides for liability of one
who sells a defective product if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product.
The court decided that a hospital which furnishes blood to its patients and charges them
for it is selling blood within the meaning of section 402A. The court further rejected any
distinction between the liability of blood banks and hospitals in the supplying of defective
blood, and stated that the fact that serum hepatitis is impossible to detect in blood would
not be a defense under section 402A. Although this case was predicated upon section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts, rather than any implied warranty cause of action, it
is interesting to observe that the court used an implied warranty analogy in reaching its
conclusion: "Although we do not specifically here deal with the applicability of implied
warranties in connection with this transaction, but rather whether the strict tort liability
theory may properly be employed by plaintiff, ...it cannot be gainsaid that the policy
considerations marshalled by Pearlmutter and its progeny are relevant to our decision. [Hiow-
ever, we are unable to accept the reasoning of the Pearlmutter majority and those cases from
other jurisdictions following it. [It is unrealistic] to assert that the transfusion of whole
blood by a hospital into a patient, for which a charge is made does not give rise to implied
warranties because no 'sale' is involved .... We have ...frequently distinguish[ed] be-
tween medical and administrative acts, even when performed by the same person, recognizing
that the contract is divisible, and, while we have held hospitals immune when they have
carefully selected persons supplying the human skill, we have never extended that doctrine to
physical material which was bad, as the impure morphine solution 'unfit for use' in Volk
v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596, 597 ... ." Id. at -, - N.E.2d at -
(citations omitted & emphasis deleted).
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is permissible upon the claim here made, even if it should ultimately be determined
that the transfer of blood from a hospital for transfusion into a patient is a service.130
Because of the sketchy trial court record, the supreme court refused to
decide if the furnishing of blood would be labeled as a sale or service
and then carefully limited the holding by stating:
Nevertheless, recognizing that the law in the area of products liability is in a state of
flux, we wish to make clear what this decision does not mean. We do not decide
that the extent of the warranties implied at common law in non-sales situations need
necessarily be the same as those given statutory sanction in sales transactions under
the Uniform Commercial Code. Nor do we decide that all types of sales transactions
in all situations necessarily give rise to warranties of the same extent .... 37
It should be noted that the Arizona and California statutes'" which
provide that the furnishing of blood is not a sale could easily be circum-
vented under the holding of this case.
The "service rather than sale" approach of the blood plasma cases
might be acceptable if limited to the narrow area of defective blood, but,
unfortunately, the rationale has been extended to cases involving defec-
tive hypodermic needles,189 surgical nails, 40 and heart pacemakers.14'
This approach has been motivated by a desire to protect the hospital and
doctor, or dentist, from liability on an absolute basis. The opinions have
been clouded, if not confused, by rhetoric explaining that hospitals and
doctors do not insure their treatment,'42 and that any extension of
warranty liability to doctors would be socialistic.4 3
The judicial refusal to extend implied warranty concepts to the "sale"
of blood by blood banks and hospitals and the "sale" of surgical devices
by physicians and hospitals is wrong for the following reasons:
1. Private blood banks which sell blood for profit should be liable for
harm caused by defective blood in the same way any other profit-making
enterprise should bear responsibility, with the risk being defrayed by
insurance. Statistically, the incidence of serum hepatitis is relatively
136. 439 Pa. at 507, 267 A.2d at 870 (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 508-09, 267 A.2d at 871 (citations omitted).
138. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1970) ; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1606
(West 1970).
139. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. 1968), aff'd
per curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
140. Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); cf.
Chesire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
141. Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
142. See Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 225, 241 A.2d 637, 638 (App. Dlv.
1968) (dissenting opinion); Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 856, 857 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966).
143. Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 856, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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high," 4 and the expensive consequences ought to be defrayed by pooling
the risk through insurance coverage.
2. At first blush, it is an appealing argument to say that warranty
liability should not be imposed on blood, which is an absolute necessity
furnished to preserve life; however, this same argument could be made
to exonerate suppliers of food and drink who are now subject to warranty
liability regardless of fault.
3. When a court refuses to impose implied warranty liability upon
a doctor or hospital on the ground that administering an injection with
a needle with a latent defect does not constitute a "sale," it does so upon
the rationale that a professional man or hospital does not warrant his
treatment. The court has missed the mark; the doctor or hospital is not
being sued because his professional treatment was defective, rather he
is being sued because an implement that he used was subject to a latent
defect. No moral blame is being asserted against the doctor or hospital
just as no moral blame is being asserted against a grocery store which
is sued on an implied warranty in the sale of a can of food which
was subject to a latent defect. The use of the words "sale" and "pro-
fessional services" simply cloud the issue. Basically, is there any real
difference between suing a beautician on an implied warranty for defects
in a hair lotion and suing a doctor or a hospital on an implied warranty
for defects in a hypodermic needle or in a surgical nail?
4. When courts exonerate hospitals and doctors from any kind of
warranty liability for defects in medical devices, whether needles, surgi-
cal pins, or medicines, they may be directly depriving the patient of any
remedy against the manufacturer or making the remedy extremely
difficult. For example, if the jurisdiction in which the medical treatment
occurred still persists in the antiquated notion that there must be
privity of contract in order to activate the warranty,' then the holding
that there is no sale between the doctor or hospital and patient also has
the result of destroying the "step-by-step" process of developing privity.
If there is a "sale" between doctor and patient, then the patient sues
the doctor who vouches in the manufacturer.40 In effect, the doctor is
merely a conduit through whom liability is assessed against the manu-
facturer. Conversely, if there is no sale between doctor and patient there
144. For some discouraging statistics see Fischer v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., S1 Del. 5S4,
149 A2d 749 (Super. Ct. 1959); P. Keeton & M. Shapo, Products and the Consumer:
Defective and Dangerous Products 733-34 (1970).
145. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (Sth Cir. 1969);
Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969); Necktas v.
General Motors Corp., - Mass. -, 259 N.E.2d 234 (1970).
146. T.C.C. § 2-607.
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may not be privity of contract between patient and manufacturer of the
device and the patient will not have an implied warranty remedy. The
reader may object that even if there is no implied warranty remedy,
there may be a negligence or strict liability remedy by application of
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. Unfortunately, this
latter answer overlooks the jurisdictional problem presented if the
manufacturer has no sales office or agent within the state of the plaintiff-
patient sufficient under such state's long-arm statute for service of
process. 4 ' Under the Code's "vouching-in" procedure, almost all juris-
dictional problems are eliminated, but this vouching-in process is seem-
ingly limited to an action under the Code for a breach of warranty.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACTS AND MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS
oF ARTICLE 2
A. Contracts for the Sale of Corporate Stock-Investment Securities
Corporate stocks and bonds are expressly excluded from the classifi-
cation of "goods" under Article 2,14 with Article 8 supposedly governing
these securities. However, Article 8 does not have a parol evidence rule
governing contracts for the sale of securities. This gap has been filled,
fortunately, by Comment 1 to section 2-105, which notes that the exclusion
of investment securities from the coverage of Article 2 is not intended to
prevent the application of a particular section of Article 2 when it is
sensible to do so, if Article 8 does not cover the situation.149 In direct
response to this invitation of the Code's commentator, two courts have
applied section 2-202--the parol evidence section for the sale of goods-
to contracts calling for the sale of corporate stock.150
In a somewhat similar vein, another court has applied sections 2-106
and 2-304 of the Code to determine if a contract called for the sale of
common stock purchase warrants.'" If the contract did call for the
common stock purchase sale of warrants, then section 8-319, the Statute
of Frauds, would have required the contract to be in writing in order to
147. See, e.g., Tetco Metal Prod., Inc. v. Langham, 387 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1968).
148. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
149. Id., Comment 1.
150. Stem & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965); Hunt
Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 49 Misc. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on
other grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1st Dep't 1966) (both the trial and
appellate courts agreed that U.C.C. § 2-202 applied).
151. Moritmer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 373, 269 N.Y.S.2d
724 (1st Dep't 1966). See also Cohn, Ivers & Co. v. Gross, 56 Misc. 2d 491, 289 N.Y.S.2d
301 (App. T. 1968), which held that a "call" was not a security; hence U.C.C. § 8-319, the
Statute of Frauds section, was not applicable. However, the court noted that the trial
court had held that the Statue of Frauds section of Article 2 (§ 2-201) did not apply because
the sales price was less than $500, while the appellate court held that U.C.C. § 1-206
would apply to the sale of these "calls." Id. at 495, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
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be enforceable. The court held that, when the plaintiff and defendant
agreed that if the plaintiff would purchase stock from a third party the
defendant would transfer stock purchase warrants to the plaintiff, this
was an agreement contemplating a transfer of title of the stock warrants
to the plaintiff. Hence, there would be a sale under section 2-106 if the
transfer was for a "price." The court then held that inasmuch as the
"price" under section 2-304 "can be made payable in money or other-
wise," the word "otherwise" would include the plaintiff's purchase of
stock from the third party since this was sufficient consideration to
support a contract. As a result, the oral contract for purchase of the
warrants came within section 8-319 and was not enforceable when this
defense was asserted. The dissenting judge was of the view that the
word "otherwise" would not "include the doing or refraining from per-
formance of an act as within what may constitute 'price, 1 2 and, even if
it did, the doing of that act which assumedly would constitute the pay-
ment of the price would take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. It
is to be noted that both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed on
the applicability of selected sections of Article 2 to a transaction encom-
passed within Article 8 of the Code.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Edwin I.
Schoettle Co. Appeal,-' held that Article 2 was not applicable to a con-
tract involving the purchase of capital stock of a corporation. The plain-
tiff purchased all of the stock of a corporation pursuant to a highly
detailed purchase contract which provided, in part, that as a condition
precedent, the financial condition of the corporation at the time of
closing was not to be less favorable than "'the financial condition shown
on the statements of said corporations dated June 30, 1954 and warranted
to be true and complete in paragraph 5 (e) hereof ... .' "', The buyer
subsequently alleged that the financial condition was less favorable on
the date of purchase of the stock and brought arbitration proceedings
claiming that he was entitled to reimbursement in accordance with the
purchase agreement. The court held that the seller did not expressly
warrant the financial condition, and that since the contract was inte-
grated, no implied warranties under Article 2 would be considered. The
court quoted Comment 1 to section 2-105(1), but flatly held that Article
2 (particularly sections 2-714, 2-717 and 2-720) was not applicable to
this situation involving a sale of capital stock. It would appear from
this not altogether clear opinion that the court believed that it was not
sensible to apply the cited sections of Article 2 because of the facts of
152. Mortimer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 373, 377, 269
N.Y.S.2d 724. 728 (1st Dep't 1966).
153. 390 Pa. 365, 134 A.2d 908 (1957).
154. Id. at 369. 134 A.2d at 911.
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this particular case. This case does not mean that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has rejected the use of Article 2 by analogy in future
cases involving different facts.
B. Recovery of Overhead Expenses as Damages for Breach of a
Processing Contract
It is the general rule that when one party contracts to perform con-
struction work or processing work for another party and the latter party
is guilty of an anticipatory breach, the aggrieved party may sue the
breaching party for loss of profits. The rule becomes less general when
the courts attempt to define what is meant by the word "profit;" does it
mean net profit (the contract price less the sum of direct costs and
overhead costs) or gross profit (the contract price less direct costs)?
The choice between these two rules is of more than academic interest
because if the aggrieved party is denied the right to recover his over-
head costs, his overhead must then be allocated against other jobs or con-
tracts, which will reduce his net profit per job or contract and therefore
reduce his total net profit for the fiscal year.
In short, it is not a question, as is sometimes stated, of merely good
accounting practice; it is often a question of profit or loss for the year.
Section 2-708 of the Code provides that in the event of a non-acceptance
or repudiation by the buyer in a case involving the sale of goods, the
measure of damages for the vendor is the difference between the market
price (at the time and place of tender) and the unpaid contract price,
together with any incidental damages. However, if this standard "is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would
have done"'1 5 then the standard "is the profit (including reasonable
overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance .
together with any incidental damages .... ,,1
In Vitex Manufacturing Corp. v. Caribtex Corp.,'5 7 a federal district
court held that when Caribtex failed to deliver any wool for processing
to Vitex in accordance with the parties' contract, Vitex was entitled to
recover for loss of profits. The court stated that it was not required "to
consider Vitex's overhead costs"'58 in the sense that the court was not
required to add these costs to the direct costs and then deduct the sum
from the contract price. In a rather complicated fashion, the court was
saying that the aggrieved plaintiff was entitled to recover "gross profit"
from the defaulting defendant. The court of appeals, after admitting that
the processing contract was not controlled by section 2-708 of the Code,
155. U.C.C. § 2-708.
156. Id.
157. 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967).
158. Id. at 796.
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stated that the Code was persuasive because it embodies the foremost
modem legal thought concerning commercial transactions, and affirmed
the district court.
C. Breach of Warranty as a Defense in an Action for the Price
in a Processing Contract
Another cloth processing problem arose in Vitromar Piece Dye Works
v. Lawrence of London, Ltd.59 Here, the plaintiff contracted to water-
proof thousands of yards of materials supplied by the defendant in
accordance with a sample furnished by the plaintiff. The plaintiff water-
proofed the material and returned it to the defendant, who failed to pay
the contract price. The plaintiff sued, and the defendant affirmatively
stated that the plaintiff's waterproofing was defective, resulting in
material which was tacky and which required the defendant to expend
money in attempting to cure the tackiness. The defendant further asserted
that some of the materials, which had been made into coats, could not be
sold and that some could only be sold at a lesser price. The defendant then
counterclaimed for damages which allegedly occurred as a result of the
plaintiff's defective work. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant
upon the complaint and in favor of the plaintiff upon the counterclaim of
the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and the Illinois court held that
the parties had agreed that New York law should apply. The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant should be liable for payment of the purchase
price because the defendant had accepted the goods under sections 2-
606(1) (a) and 2-607 of the UCC and was liable for the price under
section 2-709(1) (a). The appellate court affirmed the judgment and
held that the principles articulated in the above-cited sections of the
Code should be applied even though the facts did not involve a sale. "We
note ... that courts have recognized the policies embodied in the Uniform
Acts as applicable in reason to subject matter which was not expressly
included in the language of the Act."-16 0
D. Article 2 and Ship Charter Contracts
Article 2 pertains to the sale of goods which may be carried by ship.
Article 7 covers bills of lading, which control the title to these goods, and
deals with other aspects of their transportation. Article 9 deals with the
financing of the purchase-sale of these goods. However, do any of these
articles deal expressly with the situation considered in Transatlantic
Financing Corp. v. United States? 61 The United States chartered a private
vessel to transport goods from the United States to a port in Iran. The
159. 119 M/. App. 2d 301, 256 N.E.2d 135 (1969).
160. Id. at 307, 256 N.E.2d at 138.
161. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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ship left the United States within a few days of the closing of the Suez
Canal by Egypt in 1956, and, as a result, the ship had to make the
longer journey around the Cape of Good Hope. The United States paid
the original charter price and then the shipowner brought suit against
the United States on a quantum meruit basis for the increased costs of
shipment. The main thrust of the shipowner's case was that the original
contract became legally impossible to perform and the shipowner's
delivery by a different and more expensive route conferred a benefit upon
the United States. This case arose in 1956, when only Pennsylvania had
adopted the Code. Hence, the Code was not binding upon the shipowner,
nor would it have been binding upon the United States even if it had
been universally adopted. Furthermore, no section of the Code expressly
deals with the question of impossibility vis-a-vis charter contracts. The
court of appeals cited sections 2-614 and 2-615 as authority, without
articulating the basis for the Code's applicability. Although it may be
subject to dispute,'62 it would appear that the ultimate holding of the
court-that performance was not rendered legally impossible-was based
on Comment 4 to section 2-615, to the effect that increased cost alone
does not excuse performance of a contract unless the rise in cost is due to
some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the
performance. In this case the shipowner claimed an added expense of
$43,972 over and above the contract price of $305,842.92. The court
was careful to note:
While it may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and difficulty of per-
formance never constitute impracticability, to justify relief there must be more of a
variation between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available alternative
than is present in this case, where the promisor [the shipowner] can legitimately be
presumed to have accepted some degree of abnormal risk, and where impracticability
is urged on the basis of added expense alone.16
E. The Parol Evidence Rule and Contracts for Services
Section 2-202, the parol evidence section of the Code, has received
a rather unusual application in a recent case.' A manufacturer of hair-
dressing lotions operated an instruction center where it employed tech-
nicians to give instruction to hairdressers. The manufacturer used models
in the course of this instruction, and these models, in return for free
hairdressing services, had to sign cards which purported to release the
manufacturer from all liability incurred as a result of the hair treatment.
A model signed this card, received hair treatment and suffered injury to
her ear as a result of it. The model sued and during the trial the parties
stipulated that if the model testified, she would testify that an employee
162. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 401 (1966) (Editors' Note).
163. 363 F.2d at 319 (emphasis added & footnotes omitted).
164. Ciunci v. Wella Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 109, 271 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1966).
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of the manufacturer had told her on three occasions that the form was
designed to immunize the company for harm caused to the model's hair,
while the manager of the manufacturer would testify that he had no
knowledge of any alleged conversation with the model relative to the
meaning of the form. The court held that this stipulation could not be
admitted because it did not express any agreement as to facts; however,
the court noted that the card did not refer to the ear and the testimony
of the parties would be necessary to ascertain the intent of the parties.
"Such testimony would be admissible, for it would not contradict the
writing, but would be evidence of a consistent additional term to the
writing."' 65 It has been asserted that it is clear that this agreement was
not one for the sale of goods, hence it was not within the scope of Article
2 of the Code.'66 It is therefore difficult to see why the court applied, in
effect, section 2-202, unless the court was of the unexpressed view that
warranty liability would be applicable in a service transaction. Therefore,
by extension, the parol evidence rule of the same article could be used
to determine the meaning of a form purportedly designed to release the
manufacturer from liability. If it is permissible to extend liability by
analogy, then it ought to be permissible to reduce it by analogy.
VII. THE CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL STATUTES IN LIGHT
OF ARTICLE 2
The use of the Code by analogy in administrative proceedings under
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 192117 was illustrated in Stratton
Sale Barn, Inc. v. Reed.68 Stratton Sale Barn, Inc., a livestock market
agency, sold 152 head of cattle to Christian (a cattle company), which
gave its check in payment. Christian then sold 52 of the steers to Reed
(a livestock dealer) in return for Reed's crediting the price of the steers
as payment of an antecedent debt owed to Reed by Christian. Reed also
gave Christian a check for a small amount as the difference between the
debt and the sales price of the steers. Unfortunately, Christian's check
to Stratton was dishonored and Stratton brought reparation proceedings
against Reed. The judicial officer in the proceedings stated that Stratton,
as a defrauded seller, retained an equitable right of rescission which it
could exercise against anyone but a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice, and that the prior view had been that the purchaser of chattels
in payment of an antecedent debt did not acquire them for value. The
officer held, however, that the UCC does provide that an antecedent
165. Id. at 111, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
166. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 811 (1966) (Editors' Note).
167. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1964).
168. 28 AgrL Dec. 677, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 922, affd, 28 AgrL Dec. 1418, 7 UCC Rep. Serv.
192 (1969).
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debt constitutes value and that under section 2-403 of the Code "one
taking from a person with voidable title, without notice, and in total
or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim, is entitled to protection
as a bona fide purchaser,"'0 9 and that "[a] Ithough we are not bound by
the Code in deciding whether a person subject to the Act has engaged in
any proscribed practice for which reparation may be awarded, the Code
is a factor to be considered in determining what is 'unfair' in the context
of the livestock industry."'170
In reparation proceedings instituted under the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act,' based upon the breach of an oral contract to purchase
a crop of apples, the Department of Agriculture's judicial officer ruled
that the Statute of Frauds of the Code (section 2-201) would not be
applicable because the Statute of Frauds is procedural. However, the
judicial officer cited sections 2-706 and 2-610 as controlling in determin-
ing the questions of anticipatory breach and the measure of damages.'
VIII. CONTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The Supreme Court of the United States held in 1943 that legal ques-
tions dealing with negotiable instruments in which the United States is
a party are to be decided by federal "common law" and not by the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, which was then the "uniform" law of the various
states.73 This decision may be justified upon the basis of a supposed
need for uniformity, preservation of federal rights and the fact that the
government is a non-profit enterprise which has a greater difficulty in
insuring the honesty of its employees than does the enterprise which
deals with the government. 7 4 However, it would appear that this decision
was merely one facet of the broader view that the validity and construc-
tion of contracts of the United States government "through which the
United States is exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences
on the rights and obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they
create or permit, all present questions of federal law not controlled by the
law of any State."' 5 In spite of this approach to a federal common law,
many federal courts and administrative tribunals adopted the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act as "common law."' 70 This adoption of statutes
169. Id. at 681, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. at 925.
170. Id.
171. 7 U.S.C. §§ 499(a)-(s) (1964).
172. Aura Orchards v. A. Peltz & Sons, Inc., 27 Agri. Dec. 1546, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 149
(1968).
173. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, modified, 318 U.S. 744 (1943).
174. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 304 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
175. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
176. For a listing of the authorities, see Appeal of Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 71 Interior
Dec. 384, 389-90 nn.5 & 6, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 225, 231 nn.5 & 6 (1964).
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as common law has accelerated with the adoption of the UCC, and now
numerous federal courts177 and administrative tribunals178 have adopted
Article 2 as a source for the federal law of sales. It would now appear that
it does not matter whether the United States is the complaining party or
the defendant, or what the nature of the case may be-the provisions of
Article 2 will control. For example, the Board of Contract Appeals of
the Atomic Energy Commission has ruled that parol evidence relating
to the negotiations leading to a contract between a private company and
the AEC is admissible to aid the Board in interpreting the contract.170
"The admission of such evidence is in accord with the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code which is an appropriate source of Federal
law."' The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has also used
Article 2 of the Code in a case in which a government contractor sought the
contract price for magnetic tape sold to the Army, while the Army sought
to defeat the claim and to recover the costs of buying substitute tape.18'
The Board held that the parol evidence rule of the Code permitted parol
evidence to show a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability,
and to show the vendor's knowledge of the purpose for which the buyer
made the purchase, in order to show an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose. However, parol evidence of an express warranty
could not be introduced because the contract was integrated. The Board
relied on sections 2-314 and 2-315 as creating the warranties and then
followed section 2-316 in holding that since the Government had examined
a sample of the magnetic tape prior to entering into the contract and the
defects in the tape were of a kind that the Government ought to have
discovered, there was no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The
Board of Contract Appeals of the Department of the Interior has held
in two cases that the legal principle of cumulation of warranties articu-
lated in the UCC forms part of the general federal common law applicable
to government supply contracts.8 2 The question now arises: if general
UCC law is to govern the rights and duties of the United States in sales
questions, why should there be a special federal common law-a law which
177. E.g., United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); Everett Ply-
wood & Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d 425 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
178. Appeal of General Elec. Co., 72 Interior Dec. 278, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 1036 (1965);
Appeal of the Carpenter Steel Co., 3 AEC Rep. 317, 2 UCC Rep. Sere. 775 (1965); Appeal
of Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 71 Interior Dec. 384, 2 UCC Rep. Serm. 225 (1964).
179. Appeal of the Carpenter Steel Co., 3 AEC Rep. 317, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 775 (1965).
180. Id. at 319, 2 UCC Rep. Ser. at 776.
181. Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9030, 9130, 2 UCC Rep. Ser.
210 (Armed Services Bd. of Contract Appeals 1964).
182. Appeal of General Elec. Co., 72 Interior Dec. 278, 2 UCC Rep. Ser. 1036 (1965);
Appeal of Federal Pac. Elec. Co, 71 Interior Dec. 384, 2 UCC Rep. Ser. 225 (1964).
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may be terribly confused in certain aspects of the law of negotiable in-
struments? 1
83
IX. CONCLUSION
The spread of Article 2 concepts into areas other than sale of goods has
just begun, and within the next decade much of the present-day law of
contracts will be of merely historical interest. Three interrelated, yet
disparate catalytic forces will accelerate the infiltration of Code concepts
into the common law of contracts.
1. Busy lawyers, and both trial and appellate courts, are in desperate
need of a relatively simple, quickly available source of law for the majority
of cases where the amount in controversy cannot justify countless hours
of research and analysis of conflicting case law. The UCC fills this need,
and if the problem does not deal with sale of goods contract, then the
Code has to be stretched a bit in order to fill this need.
2. Many of the professional and academic experts who have helped
draft, shape and criticize the Code are also engaged in drafting, shaping
and criticizing the growth of the law of contracts. For example, if one
looks at the latest tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, 84 it will be obvious that Article 2's notions of good faith18 and
unconscionability i80 have been adopted to apply to all contracts.
187 It
does seem unfortunate, however, that most of the illustrations of the
draftsmen are drawn from the sale of goods area; bad faith and uncon-
scionability are not unique to merchants. Article 2's parol evidence and
integration of contract rules have also been interwoven into the Restate-
ment's more complex approach to an ever-present and troubling prob-
lem.18 8 The Code's concepts of usage, trade usage and course of dealing
have also been adopted. 9
3. The use of particular sections of the Code lends an aura of authority
and may justify a judge in doing forthrightly something that he has had
to do in the past by twisting the law, or doing something that he has been
afraid to do in the past because of a lack of enough clear authority to
support his position.
183. Compare United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 304 F. Supp. 955 (ED. Pa.
1969) and United States v. Bank of America Natl Trust and Say. Ass'n, 288 F. Supp. 343
(ND. Cal. 1968), with United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 274
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1959) and Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.
1957).
184. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 231 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
185. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19) & 2-103(1)(b).
186. U.C.C. § 2-302.
187. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 231 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
188. Id. §§ 235-44.
189. Id. §§ 246, 248-49.
